Across the track: Mind and experience

• The sharing essay states the possibility and its condition: compatible regulation of one vehicle by two economies, where constitutive dependence is not exclusive dependence (sharing).
• What Phenomenal Intuition Gets Right uses it to fix what intrinsic character means. Two surrounding perspectives need not multiply or recolor a shared occurrence unless they alter its constitutive regulation. It also makes privacy a mixed case (distinctness).
• Experience, Selfhood supplies the criterion that describes it: an occurrence belongs to the subject whose regulation partly constitutes it, so one constituted by two economies belongs to two subjects (belonging).
• Is the Monastery Minded? applies the criterion to an institution. A minded monastery’s experiences are some of its monks’ experiences, and the sharing adds no occurrence (whose experiences).

What Phenomenal Intuition Gets Right concludes that some indiscriminable experiences differ in character, so presence is finer than recognition and ineffability is partly veridical (finer than recognition). Experience, Selfhood uses the same conclusion twice. Against Yu and Carruthers, discrimination is only one effect of an organization that can be finer than it (Carruthers). Against Yudkowsky’s two classes, such differences matter within the occurrence without reaching report (implementation). The Grain essay says the series shows only that character outruns pairwise discrimination. By Goodman’s criterion a quality space built from the whole matching profile registers those differences. The hardness argument needs character beyond the whole profile, and the essay argues for that from types and tokens and from realization (overflow).

• What Phenomenal Intuition Gets Right: an unfolded cascade with no persistent carrier for corrections is an organization of which strong illusionism would be true (strong illusionism).
• Experience, Selfhood: every physical process is acyclic in time, so what matters is a persistent carrier, which a residual stream keeps. The difference is invisible to behavior and visible to intervention (implementation).
• The Grain of the Hard Problem: unfolding is the realization route to overflow. Two organizations can share every discriminative disposition and differ in vehicle organization. Whether experience is preserved is called contested (overflow).
• Is the Monastery Minded?: weak unfolding passes the whole state in its own format and preserves experience. Strong unfolding may destroy the carrier. Mindedness depends on neither, and an institution’s records sit near the strong kind (vehicles).

Presence and Actuality argues that once an organization is correctly identified, its existence is established, and nothing is added by asking whether it also possesses esse. In the same essay the author withdraws his own indexical account of actuality (organization, construction). The Grain essay uses the middle tier to fix the grain of experience: it is the grain that the vehicles’ own regulation respects, a coarse variable that earns reality by being respected in interaction. It notes that this takes a side Michał has not taken, since he holds that for phenomenal consciousness “the ontological aspect is paramount” (coarse-graining). The monastery essay answers Thomas’s question of who chooses the relevant grain with the same notion: nobody chooses, and the monastery’s cross-monk corrections preserve only what sentences and acts carry (field). Experience, Selfhood adds that its binding account of perspective does not restore the withdrawn claim (belonging).

Experience, Selfhood leans strongly against the local variant and mildly favors the global over the hybrid, without building on the leanings (regulation). The monastery essay disowns the local variant. It leaves the binding of contents into one phenomenal now to access, which changes the explanatory target and gives up the conjecture that binding is what experiential regulation adds. The monastery’s share in its monks’ experiences depends on this: only on the local variant would a monk’s internalized Rule stand outside his experiences (whose experiences). The Grain essay answers Michał’s cogwheel worry with the global variant. The regulation that binds a moment draws information from across the system, working memory included, so a wider understanding can shape the moment without being contained in it (cogwheel).

Presence and Actuality adopts the view that physics is a coarse-graining by bounded observers. It remarks that on a structuralist reading there are no natures beneath structure for experience to draw on, and that experience is organized at a grain far coarser than fundamental physics (construction). What Phenomenal Intuition Gets Right defines intrinsic character structurally and traces the appearance of an uncomposed nature to the uptake clause and that is all. It concludes that the position is type B with a gap in access the theory predicts (simplicity, what is owed). The Grain essay joins the two. The Russellian’s paradigm of an intrinsic nature is structure below the grain of recognition. Physics has a grain, and for observers like us it refines the grain of experience. The identity of experience with vehicle organization is necessary and known a posteriori, and the a posteriori part is that discovered ordering of grains (physics).